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Abstract
This paper examines equilibrium determinacy of a discrete-time AK growth
model with a generalized Taylor rule under which interest rate responds to the
growth rate of real income as well as to the rate of inflation. We use the stan-
dard money-in-the-utility formulation in which money is superneutral on the
balanced-growth path. We show that even in such a simple environment, the
generalized Taylor rule may yield indeterminacy of equilibrium easily. We also
demonstrate that equilibrium determinacy depends on the timing of money
holding of households as well.
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1 Introduction
Taylor (1993) proposes a monetary policy rule for economic stabilization under which
the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to real income as well
as to the rate of inflation. However, the existing theoretical studies on the interest
control rules often assume that the interest rate responds to inflation alone 1. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the efficacy of the original Taylor rule in the
context of a model of endogenous growth. We introduce money into the basic AK
growth model via the money-in-the-utility-function formulation. In such a simple
environment, money is superneutral on the balanced growth path. In our setting,
however, money is not superneutral in the transition process and, hence, the selection
of monetary policy rule may have relevant effects on determinacy of equilibrium path
leading to the balanced-growth equilibrium.
We construct our model in a discrete-time setting, which enables us to consider
alternative timings of households’ money holdings and of the inflation rate used for
controlling nominal interest rate. As for money holding of the household, we can
distinguish the cash-in-advance (CIA) timing from the cash-when-I’m-done (CWID)
timing. The CIA (resp. CWID) timing means that real money balances in the
utility function is the stock of money the household holds before entering (resp.
after leaving) the final goods market 2. Moreover, in our discrete-time model we
find that the main results are also sensitive to the assumption whether the central
bank’s control rule is current-looking or forward-looking. Therefore, in a discrete-
time modelling, we can analyze four patterns of formulations: (i) CWID timing
with a forward-looking rule, (ii) CIA timing with a forward-looking rule, (iii) CWID
1In models of endowment economy as in Leeper (1991) or Benhabib et. al. (2001), real income
cannot be used as an index of monetary policy.
2The discrete-time monetary models usually assume the CWID timing of the money holdings.
However, as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) claim, it is difficult to justify CWID timing on theoretical
grounds, because this assumption means that the money held at the beginning of t + 1 reduces
transaction costs in period t.
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timing with a current-looking rule, and (iv) CIA timing with a current-looking rule.
We obtain two main findings. First, the response of the interest rate to the
growth rate of income may play a significant role for equilibrium determinacy. In
fact, if the monetary authority controls interest rate in response to inflation alone,
we obtain the standard results: equilibrium determinacy holds under the forward-
looking and active current-looking monetary rule, while the passive current-looking
interest-control rule generates equilibrium indeterminacy. If the interest rate re-
sponds to the growth rate of income as well, the possibility of emergence of equi-
librium indeterminacy may be enhanced. Second, the efficacy of the generalized
Taylor rule for macroeconomic stability depends upon the timings of money holding
of the households. These findings demonstrate that the monetary authority should
carefully select a specific interest rate control rule in order to attain stability even
if the economic environment is simple enough to hold superneutrality of money in
the long run.
Several studies are closely related to this paper. As for the equilibrium deter-
minacy in monetary growth model with an AK technology, Suen and Yip (2005)
and Chen and Guo (2007) introduce money into the model in the form of cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint. Those authors show that the balanced-growth path may
be indeterminate under a constant money growth rule if the CIA constraint applies
not only to consumption but also to investment so that money is not superneutral
on the balanced growth path 3. Indeterminacy is generated by this form of the CIA
constraint rather than by monetary policy rule.
Li and Yip (2004) and Meng and Yip (2004) investigate the effect of Taylor-type
interest rate control in the neoclassical growth (i.e. exogenous growth) models. The
main message of these studies is that in the neoclassical growth models equilibrium
is mostly determinate regardless of the form of interest rate control rules. Such a
conclusion may not hold in endogenous growth models. Fujisaki and Mino (2007)
3Chen and Guo (2007) generalize Suen and Yip (2005) in a way that the CIA constraint applies
to consumption and to a certain fraction of gross investment.
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use an AK growth model with a generalized Taylor rule to demonstrate that equilib-
rium indeterminacy may emerge more easily than in the exogenous growth models.
Since Fujisaki and Mino (2007) use a continuous-time formulation, our discrete-time
setting can provide us with a richer set of results concerning equilibrium determi-
nacy.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households with a unit mass. The
agent maximizes her lifetime utility
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mt−J), 0 < β < 1, J = 0, 1 (1)
subject to the flow budget constraint such that
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + ct +mt + bt + τt = yt + mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
, 0 < δ < 1. (2)
Each variable means the following: β=time discounting rate; δ=capital depreciation
rate; ct =real consumption; mt−J=real money balances at the beginning of period
t − J + 1; kt=(per capita) stock of capital; bt=real stock of bonds at the end of
period; τt=lump-sum tax; yt=real income; pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1=gross rate of inflation;
Pt=nominal price level; Rt−1=gross nominal interest rate in period t − 1. In this
paper, we specify the utility function as follows:
u(ct,mt−J) =
(cρ1t m
ρ2
t−J)
1−σ
1− σ , ρ1 + ρ2 = 1, σ > 0,
where σ is the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 4. This felicity
function satisfies sign(ucm) = sign(1 − σ), so that consumption and real money
4This instantaneous utility function satisfies uc > 0, um > 0, ucc < 0, umm < 0, uccum −
ucmuc < 0, and ummuc−ucmum < 0. That is, the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in c and m, and consumption c and real money balances m are both normal goods.
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balances are Edgeworth complements if 0 < σ < 1, while they are Edgeworth
substitutes if σ > 1. We define J = 1 as cash-in-advance (CIA) timing, and J = 0
as cash-when-I’m-done (CWID) timing.
We assume that the production function of the representative firm is given by a
simple AK technology, yt = Akt. Thus the competitive rate of return to capital is
fixed at A.
To derive the optimality conditions for the household’s consumption plan, set up
the following Lagrangian function:
L ≡
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct,mt−J)+λt
[
−kt+1+(1−δ)kt−ct−mt−bt−τt+Akt+mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
]}
.
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are:
λt = uc(ct,mt−J) = (c
ρ1
t m
ρ2
t−J)
(1−σ)ρ1
ct
; (3)
um(ct,mt) = (c
ρ1
t m
ρ2
t )
(1−σ) ρ2
mt
= λt − βλt+1
pit+1
when J = 0; (4)
um(ct+1,mt) = (c
ρ1
t+1m
ρ2
t )
(1−σ) ρ2
mt
=
λt
β
− λt+1
pit+1
when J = 1; (5)
λt−1 = βλt(A+ 1− δ); (6)
λt =
βλt+1Rt
pit+1
; (7)
lim
t→∞
βt+1λt+1kt+1 = 0; (8)
lim
t→∞
βtλtmt = 0; (9)
lim
t→∞
βtλtbt = 0. (10)
Equations (8), (9) and (10) are the transversality conditions.
From (6) and (7), we obtain the following Fisher equation:
Rt
pit+1
= A+ 1− δ. (11)
This represents the non-arbitrage condition, under which the real interest rate of
bond is equal to the net real rate of return on capital. From (3), (4), (5), (7) and
4
(11), we obtain
um(ct,mt)
uc(ct,mt)
=
ρ2
ρ1
ct
mt
=
1
A+ 1− δ
Rt − 1
pit+1
when J = 0, (12)
um(ct+1,mt)
uc(ct+1,mt)
=
ρ2
ρ1
ct+1
mt
=
Rt − 1
pit+1
when J = 1. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) show that the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and real money holdings is equal to the opportunity cost of holding money.
2.2 Capital Formation
The government budget constraint is
mt + bt + τt =
mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
. (14)
From (2), (14), and the production function yt = Akt , we obtain the goods-market
equilibrium condition:
kt+1 = Akt + (1− δ)kt − ct. (15)
Denoting zt ≡ ct
kt
, we can rewrite the condition (15) as
kt+1
kt
= A+ 1− δ − zt. (16)
2.3 Policy Rules
We consider the Taylor-type monetary policy rule under which the central bank
controls the nominal interest rate in response to the growth rate of income as well
as to the rate of either current or expected inflation. Formally, we assume that
Rt = R(pit+i, gt+i),
∂Rt
∂pit+i
≥ 0, ∂Rt
∂gt+i
≥ 0, i = 0 or 1, (17)
where gt+i ≡ yt+1+i
yt+i
=
kt+1+i
kt+i
= A+1−δ−zt+i is the gross rate of real income growth.
If i = 0 (resp. i = 1), the interest rate rule is said to be current-looking (resp.
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forward-looking), in which monetary authority uses the current (resp. expected)
values of economic variables as indices to stabilize economy 5.
For analytical simplicity, we specify (17) as
Rt = pi
∗
(
pit+i
pi∗
)φ
(A+ 1− δ)
(
gt+i
g∗
)η
, φ ≥ 0, φ 6= 1, η ≥ 0. (18)
In the above, x∗ is the steady-state value of a variable xt, and pi∗ is the target rate of
inflation. If φ > 1, the nominal interest rate rises more than one for one in response
to a change in the rate of inflation. Then, the interest control rule is said to be
active as to inflation. Conversely, the rule (18) with φ < 1 is defined as passive
monetary policy. From (11) and (18),
φ
dpit+i
pit+i
+ η
dgt+i
gt+i
=
dRt
Rt
=
dpit+1
pit+1
. (19)
If i = 1, (19) becomes
dRt
Rt
=
dpit+1
pit+1
= − η
φ− 1
dgt+1
gt+1
. When the expected
growth rate of income increases, the central bank should raise the nominal interest
rate to stabilize economy. However, since the net real rate of return to capital
is constant due to the assumption of AK technology, the real interest rate also
should be kept constant by controlling the rate of inflation to satisfy non-arbitrage
condition. Formally, (φ − 1)dpit+1
pit+1
< 0, that is, an active (resp. a passive) policy
lowers (resp. raises) rate of inflation. If i = 0, (19) is rewritten as
dpit+1
pit+1
− dpit
pit
= (φ− 1)dpit
pit
+ η
dgt
gt
.
For a positive value of η, the growth rate of inflation may be higher when the rates
of inflation and income growth rise, even if the interest control rule is passive.
From (11), (18) and gt = 1 + A− δ − zt, the equilibrium rate of inflation is
pit+1 = piF (zt+1) = pi
∗
(
1 + A− δ − zt+1
1 + A− δ − z∗
)− η
φ−1
for i = 1,
pit+1 = piC(pit, zt) = (pi
∗)−(φ−1)(pit)φ
(
1 + A− δ − zt
1 + A− δ − z∗
)η
for i = 0,
5Since we deal with a growing economy in which real income continues expanding, our formu-
lation of interest-rate control rule is a natural extension of Taylor’s (1993) original proposal.
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where
sign[piF
′(zt+1)] = sign(φ− 1),
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂pit
> 0,
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂zt
< 0, and sign
[
∂piC(pit, zt)/pit
∂pit
]
= sign(φ− 1).
Using these functions, we obtain the following:
Rt − 1
pit+1
= A+ 1− δ − 1
piF (zt+1)
= oF (zt+1) for i = 1, (20)
Rt − 1
pit+1
= A+ 1− δ − 1
piC(pit, zt)
= oC(pit, zt) for i = 0, (21)
where
oF
′(zt+1) =
piF
′(zt+1)
[piF (zt+1)]2
: sign[oF
′(zt+1)] = sign(φ− 1),
∂oC(pit, zt)
∂pit
=
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂pit
1
[piC(pit, zt)]2
> 0,
∂oC(pit, zt)
∂zt
=
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂zt
1
[piC(pit, zt)]2
< 0.
Hence, the opportunity cost of holding money is positively related to the equilibrium
rate of inflation.
3 Forward-looking Rule
3.1 The CWID timing
When we assume CWID timing of money holding and forward-looking monetary
policy rule, a complete dynamic equation is given by the following 6:
zt+1 = [θ
∗θFW (zt+2, zt+1)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (22)
where θ∗ ≡ {β(1+A−δ)} 1σ = 1+A−δ−z∗ and θFW (zt+2, zt+1) =
(
oF (zt+2)
oF (zt+1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
.
In the following, we focus on the balanced-growth path with a positive growth rate.
Linearizing (22) at the steady state where θ∗ > 1 and z∗ > 0, we obtain 7
zˆt+2 =
(
1− 1
z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)
zˆt+1 +
1 + z∗
z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
zˆt, (23)
6A derivation of the dynamics of zt in each case is shown in Appendix 1.
7We assume that 0 < z∗ < A− δ.
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Table 1: The Property of Equilibrium Path under Two Variables
p(−1) > 0 p(−1) < 0
p(1) > 0 1)Unstable: p(0) > 1 Saddle
2)Stable: p(0) < 1
p(1) < 0 Saddle Unstable
where zˆt ≡ zt − z∗ and
θ¯FWz ≡
∂θFW
∂zt+1
∣∣∣∣
ss
= −∂θ
FW
∂zt+2
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
1− σ
σ
ρ2η
[pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1](φ− 1)θ∗ .
Equation (23) is derived from zˆt+1 = z
∗θ∗θ¯FWz (zˆt+1 − zˆt+2) + (1 + z∗)zˆt. If θ¯FWz = 0,
that is, if
(1− σ)ρ2η
φ− 1 = 0, this becomes zˆt+1 = (1 + z
∗)zˆt, which implies that there
is a unique equilibrium path.
When θ¯FWz 6= 0, the corresponding characteristic equation is
pFW (µ) = µ2 −
(
1− 1
z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)
µ− 1 + z
∗
z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
= 0. (24)
The properties of equilibrium path are summarized in Table 1. In this dynamic
system, there are two jump variables, zt+1 and zt. Thus equilibrium determinacy
holds if the two roots of (24) are out of the unit circle. The critical equations for
checking the characteristic roots are the following:
pFW (1) = − 1
θ∗θ¯FWz
= − σ
1− σ
[pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1](φ− 1)
ρ2η
,
pFW (−1) = 2− z
∗ + 2
z∗
1
θ∗θ¯FWz
= 2− z
∗ + 2
z∗
σ
1− σ
[pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1](φ− 1)
ρ2η
,
pFW (0) = −1 + z
∗
z∗
1
θ∗θ¯FWz
= −1 + z
∗
z∗
σ
1− σ
[pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1](φ− 1)
ρ2η
.
Let us focus on the case of 0 < σ < 1. We can discuss the case of σ > 1 in
a similar manner. When φ > 1, pFW (1) < 0 is satisfied. Note that if η is high
pFW (−1) > 0 so that the steady state is a saddle point, otherwise the steady state
equilibrium becomes unstable. If φ < 1, then pFW (1) > 0, pFW (−1) > 0, and
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pFW (0) > 1 with low η. The following proposition and Figure 1 summarize our
result 8.
Proposition 1 Consider the economy with the CWID timing under the forward-
looking interest rate rule. Then, regardless of the sign of (1− σ), equilibrium inde-
terminacy tends to hold if
η
|φ− 1| is high.
3.2 The CIA timing
In this case, we can derive a complete dynamic system as a single equation such
that
zt+1 = [θ
∗θFI(zt+1, zt)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (25)
where θFI(zt+1, zt) =
(
oF (zt+1)
oF (zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
. Linearizing the system around the steady
state, we obtain
zˆt+1 =
(
1 +
z∗
1 + z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)
zˆt. (26)
To derive (26), we use zˆt+1 = (1 + z
∗)zˆt − z∗θ∗θ¯FWz (zˆt+1 − zˆt).
Since zt is a jump variable, the condition for indeterminacy is
(
1+
z∗
1 + z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)2
<
1, that is,
z∗(z∗ + 2 + 2z∗θ∗θ¯FWz )
(1 + z∗θ∗θ¯FWz )2
< 0.
Since z∗ > 0, the condition can be rewritten such that z∗ + 2 + 2z∗θ∗θ¯FWz < 0.
This can be satisfied when θ¯FWz < 0. We summarize the result in the following
proposition and Figure 2.
Proposition 2 In the economy with the CWID timing under the forward-looking
interest rate rule, equilibrium path is determinate if
(1− σ)ρ2η
φ− 1 ≥ 0. Otherwise,
equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge 9.
8Section 5 and Appendix 2 show how to draw Figures 1 to 4.
9This result is close to the finding in Fujisaki and Mino (2007) who use a continuous-time
formulation.
9
φη
(1a)0 < σ < 1
1
0
Figure 1. The CWID timing with forward-looking rule
determinacy indeterminacy
(1b)1 < σ
φFW1
φ
η
1
0
φFW1
φFW2
φFW2
φ
η
(2a)0 < σ < 1
1
0
Figure 2. The CIA timing with forward-looking rule
determinacy indeterminacy
(2b)1 < σ
φFI1
φ
η
1
0
φFI1
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4 Current-looking Rule
4.1 The CWID timing
A complete dynamic system in this case consists of the following difference equations:
pit+1 = (pi
∗)−(φ−1)(pit)φ
(
1 + A− δ − zt
1 + A− δ − z∗
)η
, (27)
zt+1 = [θ
∗θCW (pit, zt+1, zt)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (28)
where θCW (pit, zt+1, zt) =
(
oC(pit+1, zt+1)
oC(pit, zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
, because pit+1 = pi
C(pit, zt). The
system linearized at the steady state ispˆit+1
zˆt+1
 =
 φ −ηpi∗θ∗
Xpi Xz
pˆit
zˆt
 , (29)
where
Xpi = −φ
η
z∗
pi∗
(θ∗)2θ¯CWz (φ− 1)
(φ− 1)− z∗θ∗θ¯CWz
and Xz =
(1 + z∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CWz )(φ− 1)
(φ− 1)− z∗θ∗θ¯CWz
.
The linearized dynamic equation of zt in (29) is derived from(
1− z
∗
φ− 1θ
∗θ¯CWz
)
zˆt+1 = (1 + z
∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CWz )zˆt −
φ
η
z∗
pi∗
(θ∗)2θ¯CWz pˆit,
where
θ¯CWz ≡
∂θCW
∂zt
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
1− σ
σ
η(φ− 1)
(pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1)θ∗
= (φ− 1)∂θ
CW
∂zt+1
∣∣∣∣
ss
= −ρ2η
φ
pi∗
θ∗
∂θCW
∂pit
∣∣∣∣
ss
= (φ− 1)2θ¯FWz .
The characteristic equation is
pCW (µ) = µ2 − (φ+Xz)µ+ φXz + ηpi
∗
θ∗
Xpi = 0. (30)
There are two jump variables, pit and zt, in this system so that equilibrium determi-
nacy emerges when two roots of (30) are out of the unit circle. From (30), we find
the following:
pCW (1) =
(φ− 1)z∗
Q(η;pi∗, σ)
,
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pCW (−1) = φ(2 + z
∗) + 1 + z∗ +Q(η;pi∗, σ)
Q(η;pi∗, σ)
,
pCW (0) =
φ(1 + z∗)
Q(η;pi∗, σ)
,
where Q(η;pi∗, σ) ≡ 1− z∗θ∗(φ− 1)θ¯FWz = 1−
1− σ
σ
ρ2ηz
∗
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1.
We examine the properties of pCW (µ) when monetary policy is active (φ > 1).
Consider the case of 0 < σ < 1. If η is low enough that Q(·) > 0, the equilibrium
path is determinate, since pCW (1) > 0, pCW (−1) > 0 and pCW (0) > 1. When
Q(·) < 0 is satisfied, pCW (1) < 0 and pCW (0) < 0. Therefore, equilibrium path is
unstable or saddle. Under σ ≥ 1, Q(·) > 0 always holds. Then, pCW (1) > 0 and
pCW (−1) > 0 if φ > 1. Determinacy holds if pCW (0) > 1, which requires that φ is
large enough relative to η.
We can discuss the case of passive policy rule (φ < 1) in the same way. These
results are summarized in the propositions below and in Figure 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose that money holding satisfies the CWID timing and that
the interest-rate control is active (φ > 1) and current-looking. Then, the equilibrium
path is determinate either if η is small or if (1−σ)ρ2η = 0. If η is sufficiently large,
indeterminacy may emerge.
Proposition 4 In the case of the CWID timing and the passive current-looking
monetary policy rule (φ < 1), equilibrium indeterminacy is generated.
4.2 The CIA timing
Since oC(pit−1, zt−1) = A+1−δ− 1
pit
, a complete dynamic system in this case consists
of (27) and
zt+1 = [θ
∗θCI(pit, zt)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (31)
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where θ∗θCI(pit, zt) =
(
oC(pit, zt)
oC(pit−1, zt−1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
. Linearizing (27) and (31) around the
steady state yieldspˆit+1
zˆt+1
 =
 φ −ηpi
∗
θ∗
−φ− 1
ηpi∗
(θ∗)2θ¯CIz z
∗ 1 + z∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CIz

pˆit
zˆt
 , (32)
where
θ¯CIz ≡
∂θCI
∂zt
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
1− σ
σ
ρ2
η
(pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1)θ∗
= − η
φ− 1
pi∗
θ∗
∂θCI
∂pit
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
θ¯CWz
φ− 1
= (φ− 1)θ¯FWz .
The characteristic equation is
pCI(µ) = µ2 − (φ+ 1 + z∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CIz )µ+ φ(1 + z∗) + z∗θ∗θ¯CIz = 0. (33)
There are two jump variables pit and zt in this system so local equilibrium determi-
nacy requires that the steady state equilibrium is a source. From (33),
pCI(1) = z∗(φ− 1) ≷ 0 if φ ≷ 1,
pCI(−1) = (2 + z∗)(φ+ 1) + 2z∗θ∗(φ− 1)θ¯FWz
= (2 + z∗)(φ+ 1) + 2
1− σ
σ
ρ2ηz
∗
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1 ,
pCI(0) = φ(1 + z∗) + z∗θ∗(φ− 1)θ¯FWz = φ(1 + z∗) +
1− σ
σ
ρ2ηz
∗
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1 .
We consider the case of φ < 1 in which the result seems to be interesting.
When 0 < σ ≤ 1, pCI(−1) > 0 is satisfied, and therefore equilibrium indeterminacy
holds. If σ > 1, equilibrium determinacy is generated if η is large enough to satisfy
pCI(−1) < 0.
The main results obtained in this system are summarized as the following propo-
sitions and Figure 4.
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φη
(3a)0 < σ < 1
1
0
Figure 3. The CWID timing with current-looking rule
determinacy indeterminacy
(3b)1 < σ
φCW3
φ
η
1
0
φCW3ηCW1
φCW2
φ
η
(4a)0 < σ < 1
1
0
Figure 4. The CIA timing with current-looking rule
determinacy indeterminacy
(4b)1 < σ
φCI2
φ
η
1
0
φCI2
φCI1
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Proposition 5 Assume that the money holdings satisfies the CIA timing and that
the interest-rate control is active current-looking (φ > 1). Then equilibrium determi-
nacy holds if (1− σ)ρ2η ≥ 0. Otherwise, the equilibrium path can be indeterminate
when η is large.
Proposition 6 Assume that the economy with the CIA timing under the passive
current-looking interest-rate control rule (φ < 1). If (1−σ)ρ2η ≥ 0, balanced growth
path is a saddlepoint so that indeterminacy emerges. Otherwise, the equilibrium path
is determinate when η is large.
5 A Numerical Example
As shown above, whether the equilibrium path is determinate or not critically de-
pends on the magnitudes of σ, η, and φ. To check the plausibility of our analytical
results, we examine a numerical example. Let us set:
A = 0.08, β = 0.98, δ = 0.04, pi∗ = 1.02, ρ1 = 0.7, ρ2 = 0.3.
In addition, in order to draw the figures in (η, φ)-plane, we set σ = 0.5 or σ = 2,
which respectively implies (θ∗, z∗) = (1.0388, 0.0012) or (θ∗, z∗) = (1.0096, 0.0304)
From the critical equations for equilibrium determinacy in Sections 3 and 4, we derive
loci and substitute the numerical example into these loci as shown in Appendix 2.
According to Taylor (1993), φ = 1.5 and η = 0.5 are empirically plausible values.
Since φ and η are respectively the elasticity of nominal interest rate to the inflation
rate and to the rate of income growth, these values cannot be extremely high. We
calculate percentage of the area in which equilibrium determinacy holds within the
range 0 < φ ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ η ≤ 3. We denote the value of this range by L(σ). For
example, LF (1) = 100 and LC(1) =
2 ∗ 3
9
∗ 100 = 66.67 in the forward-looking and
current-looking rules respectively regardless of the timing of real money balances in
the MIUF. These values are the criterions to compare the numerical results. The
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Table 2: The Values of L(σ)
σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2
LFW (σ) 99.41 100.00 92.67
LFI(σ) 99.71 100.00 96.31
LCW (σ) 66.67 66.67 63.95
LCI(σ) 66.67 66.67 63.95
Table 3: Equilibrium Determinacy (1)
θ¯FWz < 0 θ¯
FW
z = 0 θ¯
FW
z > 0
CWID, FL D, I D D, I
CIA, FL D, I D D
CWID, CL (φ > 1) D, I D D, I
CWID, CL (φ < 1) I I I
CIA, CL (φ > 1) D, I D D
CIA, CL (φ < 1) I I D, I
FL=forward-looking rule, CL=current-looking rule
D=determinate, I=indeterminate
values of L(σ) are calculated in Appendix 2 and summarized in Table 2, which show
that the positive response of the interest rate to the income growth and the timing
of money holdings have small impacts on equilibrium determinacy.
6 Discussion
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results shown in Sections 3 and 4. In this section, we
discuss the intuitive implication of our findings.
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Table 4: Equilibrium Determinacy (2)
CWID, FL σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ FL with η = 0 CWID CIA
φ > 1 D, I D D, I φ > 1 D D
φ < 1 D, I D D, I φ < 1 D D
CIA, FL σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ CL with η = 0 CWID CIA
φ > 1 D D D, I φ > 1 D D
φ < 1 D, I D D φ < 1 I I
CWID, CL σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ φ = η = 0 σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ
φ > 1 D, I D D, I CWID D D D
φ < 1 I I I CIA D D D
CIA, CL σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ
φ > 1 D D D, I
φ < 1 I I I, D
FL=forward-looking rule, CL=current-looking rule
D=determinate, I=indeterminate
6.1 θ¯FWz = 0
If (1 − σ)ρ2η = 0 is satisfied, θ¯FWz becomes zero. Then, we obtain the standard
results in the AK growth model with the Taylor rule under which the nominal
interest rate responds to inflation alone. Namely, both the forward-looking and
active current-looking rules generate equilibrium determinacy, while indeterminacy
holds under the passive current-looking rule, regardless of the timings of agent’s
money holdings. Two factors neutralizing the effect of the opportunity cost of
holding money eliminate the efficacy of the generalized Taylor rule. The first is
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ρ2 = 0, which means no need for money. Secondly, when the utility is additively
separable (σ = 1), the optimal consumption is independent from the demand for
real money holdings.
Moreover, let us consider the case in which the nominal interest rate is pegged
(φ = η = 0). From the non-arbitrage condition (11), the rate of inflation is also
fixed in the case of AK technology. Therefore, the dynamics of zt is the same as in
the standard AK model and, hence, equilibrium determinacy around the balanced
growth path always holds.
6.2 Intuitive Implication
From Table 3, we obtain two significant messages. First, under the forward-looking
and active current-looking interest control rules, θ¯FWz > 0 is a sufficient condition
for equilibrium determinacy in the case of CIA timing, while it is not in the case of
CWID timing. Second, if the passive current-looking rule is adopted, determinacy
does not hold in the CWID timing and it may emerge in the CIA timing when
θ¯FWz > 0.
For example, we consider the case under which agents have a preference with
0 < σ < 1 and monetary policy rule is active and forward-looking so that θ¯FWz > 0 is
satisfied. Suppose that the economy initially stays in the balanced-growth equilib-
rium and that a rise of the growth rate of consumption is anticipated. According to
this anticipation, each agent increases consumption and thus the ratio of consump-
tion to capital z becomes larger (zt+1 > zt). Under the active interest control rule,
this means an increase of the growth rate of inflation to satisfy the non-arbitrage
condition. As shown in Section 2.3, this effect results from the generalization of the
interest control rule.
When the timing of money holdings is CIA, the growth rate of the opportunity
cost of holding money becomes higher and that of consumption falls, because con-
sumption and real money balances are complements. It contradicts to the above
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anticipation, so that determinacy holds. In the CWID timing, this mechanism is
not effective, because the timing of the growth rate of the opportunity cost of hold-
ing money which affects the rate of consumption growth is different from the case
of CIA. Therefore, a larger z can be realized and indeterminacy may be generated.
This argument can be also applied in other cases.
6.3 Endogenous vs Exogenous Growth
Meng and Yip (2004) claim that a generalized Taylor rule may not yield indeter-
minacy in the standard neoclassical growth model. In contrast, we have shown
that the generalized Taylor rule has a pivotal effect on economic stability in the
AK growth model. To see the reason for the presence of such a difference, we
consider a continuous-time model 10. Substituting the interest-rate control rule
R = R(pi, f(k), g) into the non-arbitrage condition, R− pi = f ′(k)− δ, and lineariz-
ing it around the steady state, we obtain:
(R1 − 1)pˆi +R2f ′kˆ +R3gˆ = f ′′kˆ. (34)
Suppose that R1 > 1. In an exogenous growth model, it holds that R3 = 0 and
f ′′ < 0 < f ′, so that (34) becomes pˆi =
f ′′ −R2f ′
R1 − 1 kˆ, which satisfies
dpˆi
dkˆ
< 0,
regardless whether R2 is zero or positive. When the AK technology is assumed
(R2 = 0 and f ′′ = 0 < f ′), (34) is rewritten as pˆi = −R3R1 − 1 gˆ. Hence, pˆi = 0 if
R3 = 0 and dpˆi
dgˆ
< 0 if R3 > 0.
Therefore, when the Taylor rule is generalized, the property of equilibrium rate
of inflation is dramatically changed in the AK growth model. Such a difference is
the main reason for a stark contrast in equilibrium determinacy conditions between
the neoclassical and AK growth models.
10Notations are the same, and time index is omitted.
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7 Conclusion
By use of a discrete-time AK growth model with money, we have investigated the
stabilization effect of a generalized Taylor rule under which the nominal interest
rate responds to the growth rate of income as well as to the rate of inflation. The
central messages of our study are as follows. First, if the interest-rate control is
sensitive to the growth rate of income, monetary policy rule may play a pivotal role
for economic stability even in a simple environment in which money is superneutral
in the balanced growth equilibrium. Second, our discrete-time modelling clearly
demonstrates that the timings of money holding of the households and the time
perspective of the monetary authority critically affect the efficacy of interest control
rules. This aspect cannot be considered in the foregoing studies on equilibrium
determinacy of monetary AK growth models in continuous-time settings.
Appendix 1: Step for Deriving the Euler Equation
In all four cases of Sections 3 and 4, we use the same step for obtaining the reduced
dynamic system. First, using (12), (13), (20) and (21), we derive the demand for real
money balances in each case. Second, we substitute this money demand function
into (3), which gives the Euler equation. The growth rate of consumption in each
case consists of two parts: a common balanced growth rate of consumption obtained
in the standard AK growth model, θ∗ ≡ {β(1 + A − δ)} 1σ , and the part related to
the growth rate of the opportunity cost of holding money.
As an example, we show this step formally in the case of CWID with forward-
looking rule (Section 3.1). From (12) and (20),
mt =
ρ2
ρ1
(1 + A− δ) ct
oF (zt+1)
. (35)
Substituting this into (3), we obtain
λt = ρ1
{
ρ2
ρ1
(1 + A− δ)
}ρ2(1−σ)oF (zt+1)−ρ2(1−σ)
cσt
. (36)
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Thus the Euler equation can be expressed as
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oF (zt+2)
oF (zt+1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θFW (zt+2, zt+1). (37)
The Euler equations in Sections 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2 are respectively given by:
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oF (zt+1)
oF (zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θFI(zt+1, zt), (38)
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oC(pit+1, zt+1)
oC(pit, zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θCW (pit, zt+1, zt), (39)
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oC(pit, zt)
oC(pit−1, zt−1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θCI(pit, zt). (40)
We use pit+1 = pi
C(pit, zt) in (39) and oC(pit−1, zt−1) = A + 1− δ − 1
pit
in (40). Note
that the timing of the growth rate of the opportunity cost of holding money is one
period ahead in the case of CIA than that of CWID. Using these Euler equations
and the capital dynamics (16), we obtain the dynamics of zt in each case.
Appendix 2: Preparation for Drawing Figures
The CWID timing with forward-looking rule
The loci of pFW (−1) = 0 and pFW (0) = 1 are respectively given by
φFW1(η;σ) = 1 +
1− σ
σ
2z∗
z∗ + 2
ρ2
pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1η. (41)
φFW2(η;σ) = 1− 1− σ
σ
z∗
z∗ + 1
ρ2
pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1η. (42)
Figure (1a) displays the general loci in the case of 0 < σ < 1. According to a
numerical example in Section 5, we obtain
φFW1(η; 0.5) = 0.0059η + 1,
φFW2(η; 0.5) = −0.0059η + 1.
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Then, we can calculate LFW (0.5) in such a way that
LFW (0.5) =
(
9− 2 ∗ (0.0059 ∗ 3) ∗ 3
2
)
∗ 1
9
∗ 100 = 99.41.
When σ > 1, we can draw the loci as in Figure (1b). Substituting the numerical
example into these loci, we obtain
φFW1(η; 2) = −0.0739η + 1,
φFW2(η; 2) = 0.0728η + 1.
In this case, LFW (2) is as follows;
LFW (2) =
(
9−
{
(0.0739 ∗ 3) ∗ 3
2
+
(0.0728 ∗ 3) ∗ 3
2
})
∗ 1
9
∗ 100 = 92.67.
The CIA timing with forward-looking rule
The locus of z∗+2+2z∗θ∗θ¯FWz = 0 which is significant for equilibrium determinacy
is
φFI1(η;σ) = 1− 1− σ
σ
2z∗
z∗ + 2
ρ2
pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1η. (43)
φFI1 is a mirror image of φFW1. We draw this locus in Figure 2.
Using the numerical example, we see that the locus (43) becomes
φFI1(η; 0.5) = −0.0059η + 1, or
φFI1(η; 2) = 0.0739η + 1.
We can calculate LFI(σ) in the following manner:
LFI(0.5) = 100− (0.0059 ∗ 3) ∗ 3
2
∗ 1
9
∗ 100 = 99.705, or
LFI(2) = 100− (0.0739 ∗ 3) ∗ 3
2
∗ 1
9
∗ 100 = 96.305.
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The CWID timing with current-looking rule
The loci of Q(·) = 0, pCW (−1) = 0, and pCW (0) = 1 are respectively given by
ηCW1(σ) =
σ
1− σ
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1
ρ2z∗
, (44)
φCW2(η; σ) =
1− σ
σ
2z∗
2 + z∗
ρ2
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1η − 1, (45)
φCW3(η;σ) =
1
1 + z∗
[
1− 1− σ
σ
ρ2z
∗
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1η
]
. (46)
In the case of 0 < σ < 1. these loci are generally shown in Figure (3a). (44)-(46)
with the numerical example are the following:
ηCW1(0.5) = 168.888,
φCW2(η; 0.5) = 0.0059η − 1,
φCW3(η; 0.5) = −0.0059η + 0.9988.
ηCW1(0.5) and φCW2(η; 0.5) do not appear in the area 0 ≤ η ≤ 3. This means that
LCW (0.5) = 66.67.
Figure (3b) displays the loci when σ > 1. Substituting the numerical example
into (44)-(46), we obtain
ηCW1(2) = −13.3351,
φCW2(η; 2) = −0.0739η − 1,
φCW3(η; 2) = 0.0728η + 0.9704.
Within the area 0 ≤ η ≤ 3, ηCW1(2) and φCW2(η; 2) are not seen. Then, LCW (2) is
calculated as
LCW (2) = 100−100∗ 1
9
∗
{
1∗0.4066+ (1 + 0.0728 ∗ 3 + 0.9704) ∗ 2.5934
2
}
= 63.95.
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The CIA timing with current-looking rule
We obtain the loci of pCI(−1) = 0 and pCI(0) = 1:
φCI1(η;σ) = −1− σ
σ
2z∗
2 + z∗
ρ2
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1η − 1, (47)
φCI2(η;σ) =
1
1 + z∗
[
1− 1− σ
σ
ρ2z
∗
pi∗(A+ 1− δ)− 1η
]
. (48)
(47) is a mirror image of (45), and (48) is the same equation as (46).
These loci in the case of 0 < σ < 1 are generally drawn in Figure (4a). Substi-
tuting the numerical example into these loci, we find
φCI1(η; 0.5) = −0.0059η − 1,
φCI2(η; 0.5) = −0.0059η + 0.9988.
φCI1(η; 0.5) does not exist in the area 0 ≤ η ≤ 3. This means that LCI(0.5) = 66.67.
If σ > 1, Figure (4b) generally represents these loci. Using the numerical exam-
ple, we obtain
φCI1(η; 2) = 0.0739η − 1,
φCI2(η; 2) = 0.0728η + 0.9704.
φCI1(2) does not appear in the area 0 ≤ η ≤ 3. Then, LCI(2) is calculated in the
same way as LCW (2) so that LCI(2) = 63.95. In sum, LCI(σ) = LCW (σ) when η
takes plausible values.
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